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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a proposal condominium complex. In protecting the contract purchas-
ers, the court has implemented judicially the legislative desire to en-
courage the development of condominium projects and, in the same
instance, has formulated a progressive standard of statutory construc-
tion in an area of law which has profound social and economic impli-
cations.
CHARLES F. MIDKIFF
Torts-EMOTIONAL DAMAGE-"ZONE OF DANGER" TEST REJECTED.
Plaintiffs, mother and daughter, brought an action to recover for emo-
tional shock and resulting physical injury occasioned by witnessing the
death of a second daughter caused by the negligence of the defendant
motorist.' The lower court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to the plaintiff-daughter who was within the zone of
danger, but granted summary judgment against the plaintiff-mother
who witnessed the accident while outside the zone of danger.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the superior court in part
and awarded recovery to the plaintiff-mother. In overruling the previ-
ously controlling California case of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and
Supply Co.,2 the court based its decision on the ". . . hopeless arti-
ficiality of the zone-of-danger rule" 3 and on the leading English case
on this subject, Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.,' which allowed recovery
in analogous circumstances.
Recovery in actions for emotional shock and resulting physical in-
jury due to witnessing the peril, injury, or death of a third person has
generally been denied to bystanders, parents," spouses,7 or children.8
1. Dillon v. Legg, -- Cal.2d - 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
3. Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d - 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
4. 1 K.B. 141 (1925).
5. See, Angst v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955); Van
Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 205 Okla. 135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951); McMahon
v. Bergeson, 9 Wis.2d 256, 101 N.W.2d 63 (1960).
6. See, e.g.. Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La.
1962); Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Preece v.'Baur, 143
F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956); Southern Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28
(1916); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Steward, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Vinet v. Checker Cab Co, 140
So.2d 252 (La. App. Ct. 1962); Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113
A. 16 (1921); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Brennan v. Biber, 93
N.J. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (1966); Tobin v. Grossman, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1968); Berg
v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1962); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power Co, 155 Tenn.
611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927).
7. See, e.g., Redding v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Tyler v.
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In those jurisdictions which do allow recovery in such cases under
certain conditions, either the impact rule or the zone-of-danger rule
is followed. The impact rule, allowing recovery only if the plaintiff
was actually struck physically by the negligent defendant, is the
minority rule today. The zone-of-danger rule, which allows recovery
if the plaintiff was in the area in which he could have been struck and
could have feared for his own safety, is now the view of the majority
of jurisdictions that have dealt with this question.10
Before the instant case, the only jurisdiction in the United States
which allowed recovery to a plaintiff who was neither struck himself
nor in the area in which he might be struck or might fear for his own
safety was Puerto Rico," where such recovery is allowed by statute. 2
A few cases in other jurisdictions have also allowed recovery in such
a situation,'- but they have not altered the general rule that there
can be no recovery for mere emotional damage.14
Brown Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So.2d 203 (1948); Warr v. Kemp, 208
So.2d 570 (Ct. of App. La. 1968); All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn. App. 134, 252
S.W.2d 138 (1952); Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847
(1939).
8. See, e.g., Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959);
Curry v. Journal Publ. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937).
9. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), for a
leading example of a major state discarding the impact rule. The impact rule has been
retained in force in the. following jurisdictions: Oblatore v. Brauner, 283 F. Supp. 761
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. .688 (ED.
Ark. 1959); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 NJ. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958); Knaub
v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966).
10. See, Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Col. 1965) applying 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964) which requires that state law be followed. Colorado law
allows plaintiff to recover only if he was within the zone of danger. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Gaegler v. Thomas, 173 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1959); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co.
v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714,
156 A.2d 149 (1959); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (1957);
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,
77 A.2d 923 (1951); Jelley v. La Flame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968); Barber v.
Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, (1961); Frazee v. Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578,
47 P.2d 1037 (1935); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
11. Accord, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez Rivera, 358 F.2d 480 (1st Cir.
1966).
12. The Puerto Rican statute applied is 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141.
13. Three older cases which differ from the recent weight of authority are: Spearman
v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 N.Y.
App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1914); Gulf, C. & S.F.R.R. Co. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W.
102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906). Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (Ct.
of App. of New Orleans 1951) appears to be the sole Louisiana case which allowed re-
covery on this point of law, in direct opposition to the weight of case law of that state.
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In California, the first case to deal directly with this issue denied
recovery to a mother for shock and emotional damage caused by wit-
nessing the death of her son in an automobile accident in which she was
also injured.15 Later cases have allowed recovery only when the plain-
tiff was in the zone of danger or could have feared for his own safety."6
It has been well settled in California case law that the impact rule is
not in force in that state.' 7 A lack of duty to the plaintiff by the de-
fendant and practical considerations of public policy involving an
anticipated flood of fraudulent claims based upon an indefinable lia-
bility concept have been discussed as the basis of this point of law in
California.'8
The decision in the instant case, by allowing the recovery of the
plaintiff-mother, departs from the majority view in the United States
and from the ruling case law of California. This court found that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff on the basis of foreseeability,'
and that it was the duty of the courts to handle future cases in a man-
ner that would prevent a flood of fraudulent liability cases. ° In dis-
cussing the problem of defining the liability of the defendant in such
cases, the court suggested the following guidelines: what distance the
plaintiff was from the scene of the accident; whether the shock to the
Another case frequently cited as allowing recovery similar to the instant case is Rasmussen
v. Bensen, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937) in which the emotional damage related
only incidentally, if at all, with the peril to third persons.
14. The force and weight of this majority rule in the United States today can be
seen by the deletion of a caveat found in RESTATEMENT or ToTrs 313 (1934) which
sought to encourage the allowing of recovery to a plaintiff such as the mother in the
instant case. In explaining this deletion, the Reporter's Notes of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF Togas 313 (1965), attributed the action to the great weight of recent case
authority.
15. Claugh v. Steen, 3 Cal. App.2d 392, 39 P.2d 889 (1934); accord, Munro v. Dredging
& Reclamation Co., 84 Cal. 515, 24 P. 303 (1890).
16. Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Minkus v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1942); see Vanoni v. Western Airlines,
247 Cal. App.2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App.2d
43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957); Zeller v. Reid, 38 Cal. App.2d 622; 101 P.2d 730 (1940); Kelly
v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App.2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (1937); Kalleg v. Fassio, 125 Cal. App.
96, 13 P.2d 763 (1932); Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co, 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532
(1931); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918).
17. Accord, Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App.2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939); Sloane v. So.
Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1866).
18. These reasons were discussed at great length in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and
Supply Co, 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
19. Dillon v. Legg, - Cal.2d -, -, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
20. Id., 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at -.
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plaintiff was caused by sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident; and whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely re-
lated. 1 It is likely that this opinion will provide the foundation for
the development of a new trend in the law favoring recovery for emo-
tional disturbances.
SusAN BUNDY CocKE
Eminent Domain-CoNsEQuENriAL DAMAGEs-NoIsE ELEMENT. In
upstate New York the scenic wooded property of the Dennisons lay
in the path of a projected highway. The property and homestead were
"entirely secluded, quiet and peaceful." The state condemned a por-
tion of the land and built the highway across this portion, necessarily
destroying the view, privacy, peacefulness, and a part of the wooded
area in the process.
The Dennisons brought suit against the state, claiming consequential
damages to the remaining property and demanding compensation for
the loss in value due to future traffic noise among other factors.1 The
case was decided in favor of the claimants in the lower courts2 and was
appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York 3 where the state con-
tended that it was error to consider noise as a factor affecting the award
of consequential damages.4 The court of appeals ruled that there was
no error in considering traffic noise as an element of consequential
damages where there had been a partial taking of property, of the kind
present here, for the construction of a highway.5
About one-half the states have eminent domain provisions in their
21. Id., 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at -.
1. The claim was based on loss of privacy and seclusion, loss of view, traffic noise,
lights, and odors resulting from the highway construction and use.
2. Dennison v. State, 48 Misc.2d 778, 265 N.Y.S. 2d 671 (Ct. Cl. 1965) aff'd., 28
N.Y. App. Div. 2d 28, 281 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 1967).
3. Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708 (1968).
4. The state maintained that, although damages normally are allowed when there has
been a partial taking of land, noise damage should not be considered because it is
suffered by the general public.
5. The opinion contained much verbiage to the effect that the impracticability of
separating the noise element from a group of other, concededly proper, elements of
consideration militated against reversing and remanding the case for a new trial.
Though confusedly written, the references to this impracticability could at best be con-
sidered dicta, although applicability of such dicta is unclear. The court, having ruled
that consequential noise damage is compensable, had no need to go into the practicality
of separating it from the other factors. The courts below did not err in considering
noise, integrated with the elements of loss of view, seclusion and privacy.
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